Is there an objective morality?

[Erdall]

@Erdall Your moral arguments have quickly faded. I appreciate your contributions, but I think our debate is over.

Voiceover from Smash Bros.: And the winner is ...

Meh, you didn't need to say that fellaw. My arguments, though, I understand that they can be quite contradictory at times. Everyone's got quirks, you know, x'D

My summarized point about all this is: beware of 'looking amorale-dangerous' ideologies. Stay calm and ready tu judge them by pure, ordered common sense, not by prejudicing a lot. We all know that, basically, nazism is mostly a cancer for humanity, but it is there and it will always exist, one way or another. Just to say, never mankind will be free of such inner morale struggles, but fortunately we can endure to resist it, and also choose at times to be a little pragmatic and ignoring these kind of debates. You know, not everything in this life shall be about fightning or discussing serious topics like these.

Well, my pleasure to share opinions with you, I guess. See ya later.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Erdall

[Blaze The Great]

Voiceover from Smash Bros.: And the winner is ...

Meh, you didn't need to say that fellaw. My arguments, though, I understand that they can be quite contradictory at times. Everyone's got quirks, you know, x'D

My summarized point about all this is: beware of 'looking amorale-dangerous' ideologies. Stay calm and ready tu judge them by pure, ordered common sense, not by prejudicing a lot. We all know that, basically, nazism is mostly a cancer for humanity, but it is there and it will always exist, one way or another. Just to say, never mankind will be free of such inner morale struggles, but fortunately we can endure to resist it, and also choose at times to be a little pragmatic and ignoring these kind of debates. You know, not everything in this life shall be about fightning or discussing serious topics like these.

Well, my pleasure to share opinions with you, I guess. See ya later.

I'm not trying to discredit the things you've said. They make sense. They just don't seem to follow the line of thought of this topic, and I don't really see how they relate. Some of your ideas don't make a ton of sense, especially within context, but I'll look past that. If you want to say anything else, feel free, but try to keep more on topic. Maybe I'm just misunderstanding you, and if so, my bad.

[Makaze]

According to you, what is the truth value of this sentence? "Moral relativism is true."

High.

How is it a logical conclusion? To me the logical conclusion seems more like an acceptance of dissonance (i.e. descriptive ethics) rather than moral relativism. Just because you see that x should be but it is not, does not mean that morals are relative. It means that the moral opinions of people on x conflict each other, so we have different perspectives on the morality of x.

If so-called objective morality exists as an ought, but is not held by anyone and has no effect on reality, then what meaning does it have? Edited July 20, 2015 by Makaze

[Blaze The Great]

If so-called objective morality exists as an ought, but is not held by anyone and has no effect on reality, then what meaning does it have?

If it existed as an ought, then wouldn't society be better off to hold that morality? Also, it sounds like a high school type thing to bring up, but just because everyone is doing something doesn't mean it's right. If everyone said that the sun is fake, that wouldn't make it fake. The sun would still have an effect on us, we just wouldn't believe it.

[Phoenix Wright]

makaze has a point. if there exists an objective morality, but no one excepts it save a select few (if that), it doesn't actually hold any real meaning. it's not a question of whether we'd be affected or not, but whether the discovery has any actual meaning.

if everyone on earth, save a few, still believed in the aether over em radiation, the meaning of the discovery is lost.

in this case--the answer one way or the other doesn't matter all that much, so its meaning is most certainly lost. your analogy fails because morality isn't a physical thing that actually can have an effect on anything. by virtue of our existence morality is given purpose.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Phoenix Wright

[Chiki]

High.

First off, in classical logic and philosophy, "truth value" just means true or false. It is not on a number scale, so saying that it is high is nonsense.

Second, meta-ethical moral relativism by definition = the view that there are no objective ethical truths and that ethics is relative. The statement "moral relativism is true" is an ethical statement since it is a statement about ethics which is what "ethical" means. Thus, moral relativism is an objective view on morality, though it claims to be a subjective view on morality. Thus, meta-ethical moral relativism is self-refuting.

makaze has a point. if there exists an objective morality, but no one excepts it save a select few (if that), it doesn't actually hold any real meaning. it's not a question of whether we'd be affected or not, but whether the discovery has any actual meaning.

if everyone on earth, save a few, still believed in the aether over em radiation, the meaning of the discovery is lost.

So what? What people think/find useful has nothing to do with truth.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Chiki

[Phoenix Wright]

knowing the truth doesn't matter if people don't accept it. that's not to say the truth isn't actually the truth, but it's lost all meaning that it could have.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Phoenix Wright

[Makaze]

First off, in classical logic and philosophy, "truth value" just means true or false. It is not on a number scale, so saying that it is high is nonsense.

Second, meta-ethical moral relativism by definition = the view that there are no objective ethical truths and that ethics is relative. The statement "moral relativism is true" is an ethical statement since it is a statement about ethics which is what "ethical" means. Thus, moral relativism is an objective view on morality, though it claims to be a subjective view on morality. Thus, meta-ethical moral relativism is self-refuting.

When you put it that way...

You are intentionally wrong. Semantics don't work that way.

[Blaze The Great]

makaze has a point. if there exists an objective morality, but no one excepts it save a select few (if that), it doesn't actually hold any real meaning. it's not a question of whether we'd be affected or not, but whether the discovery has any actual meaning.

if everyone on earth, save a few, still believed in the aether over em radiation, the meaning of the discovery is lost.

in this case--the answer one way or the other doesn't matter all that much, so its meaning is most certainly lost. your analogy fails because morality isn't a physical thing that actually can have an effect on anything. by virtue of our existence morality is given purpose.

The point is that not believing something doesn't make it untrue. Regardless of how few people believe it, if x is objectively true then x will ALWAYS be objectively true. Just because we can't see meaning in it doesn't mean it is untrue.

So what? What people think/find useful has nothing to do with truth.

Chiki put it well.

[Phoenix Wright]

The point is that not believing something doesn't make it untrue. Regardless of how few people believe it, if x is objectively true then x will ALWAYS be objectively true. Just because we can't see meaning in it doesn't mean it is untrue.

Chiki put it well.

umm...

knowing the truth doesn't matter if people don't accept it. that's not to say the truth isn't actually the truth, but it's lost all meaning that it could have.

which olwen then didn't reply to...because the argument isn't focused on it being a truth, but whether it matters or not.

[Irysa]

knowing the truth doesn't matter if people don't accept it.

Strongly Disagree. Truth is intrinsically valuable.

Compare two hypothetical universes. In one, people are more enlightened and less ignorant than the other.

Can you honestly say that on principle, the universe with greater understanding of truths is equal to the other?

I'll develop this argument later because I have to go to sleep, but I really really abhor this kind of thinking.

I'm not saying that we should do that. I'm saying what we happen to act on is our relative morality, not some objective axiom. People supported and abolished slavery under relativity, always believing they were behaving morally.

You essentially stipulated that things that aren't the case don't matter, and that concepts or ideas that lead to things being the case are irrelevant. This is highly counterintuitive, because concepts precede actions.

[Blaze The Great]

umm...

which olwen then didn't reply to...because the argument isn't focused on it being a truth, but whether it matters or not.

Does something lose its truth value or overall meaning just because some people don't believe it? Those people may not FEEL that it matters differently, but that won't mean that they can't be affected by it.

Take a society where stealing is legal, because the people there all view stealing as something that is not morally wrong. Now, how will this society differ from most? Well, obviously, no stealing laws. People will likely be paranoid. Resources could become more scarce, because there will almost assuredly be people hoarding resources. Violence related to stealing would skyrocket. So, just because they don't think stealing is wrong does not mean that there will be no effect of that belief.

[Makaze]

First off, in classical logic and philosophy, "truth value" just means true or false. It is not on a number scale, so saying that it is high is nonsense.

Second, meta-ethical moral relativism by definition = the view that there are no objective ethical truths and that ethics is relative. The statement "moral relativism is true" is an ethical statement since it is a statement about ethics which is what "ethical" means. Thus, moral relativism is an objective view on morality, though it claims to be a subjective view on morality. Thus, meta-ethical moral relativism is self-refuting.

Now that I'm at a PC:

First paragraph: That was the point.

Second paragraph: Moral error theory by definition = the view that there are no intrinsic ethical truths and that ethics is constructed in error. The statement "moral error theory is true" is an ethical statement since it is a statement about ethics which is what "ethical" means. Thus, moral error theory is an objective view on morality, though it claims not to construct morality. Thus, moral error theory is self-refuting.

Editor's Note: Corrected the bold. The corrected sentence applies to both versions while the original sentence applies to neither of them.

Strongly Disagree. Truth is intrinsically valuable.

Compare two hypothetical universes. In one, people are more enlightened and less ignorant than the other.

Can you honestly say that on principle, the universe with greater understanding of truths is equal to the other?

I'll develop this argument later because I have to go to sleep, but I really really abhor this kind of thinking.

I'm glad you brought that up because I was going that direction with multiple universes. Our definition of existence is based on tangibility. Something exists if it has tangible form (can be interacted with; i.e. observed). Unicorns don't exist because they don't have tangible form. They are just concepts. If we cannot interact with a particle to observe it then it is not tangible and therefore it does not exist, except in concept. If unicorns exist in another universe but not this one, then the statement "unicorns do not exist except in concept" holds true relative to us. Existence itself is a relative concept.

Are they equal to each other? They are not identical, but that is irrelevant. Some people will be ambivalent in either scenario. According to some, the universe that is less enlightened may actually be more desirable. You only think your views are better than theirs because they are your views. Those few who believe otherwise feel the same way about theirs. Asking Phoenix if he would choose one universe for himself as proof that they are not equal is absurd. Even if he and nearly everyone chooses to agree with you and you all enlighten that universe based on your values, that still would not establish your view's supremacy unless you subscribe to the "might makes right" argument you decried earlier ("it is better because you converted the opposition" is congruent to "it is better because you physically beat them"). The concept that getting him to agree with you will make your view more objective is an appeal to might.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Makaze

[Phoenix Wright]

Truth is intrinsically valuable.

huh. i guess i never really thought about this before, but i think i disagree. i certainly feel the pursuit of truth is necessary, at least, but i don't think has intrinsic value. knowing the truth doesn't do much good, it's more how we as people act with that knowledge. we choose to make some truths meaningful and others meaningless.

being proactive towards climate change should be a no brainer for the human race. but to world leaders, to legislative bodies, to us even, the truth that we are negatively affecting our planet's climate (relative to habitability, since the universe don't give a damn if the surface of the earth is 288k or 900k) simply doesn't matter to many, many people. we actively spit in the face of truth. if we continue on our current path and all die, the outcome is the same whether we knew the truth or not...right? and if the outcome is the same, how can we say which scenario is more meaningful?

i apologize if this is incoherent. as i've said, i've never really thought about the issue and makaze's post made me think about it.

Compare two hypothetical universes. In one, people are more enlightened and less ignorant than the other.

Can you honestly say that on principle, the universe with greater understanding of truths is equal to the other?

depends. does the universe with a greater understanding of truths utilize the knowledge? cause if they don't, they're just as good as the ignorant one!

I'll develop this argument later because I have to go to sleep, but I really really abhor this kind of thinking.

hwhat kind of thinking, exactly? i don't think my position or your position on this matter actually makes any difference to anything.

Does something lose its truth value or overall meaning just because some people don't believe it? Those people may not FEEL that it matters differently, but that won't mean that they can't be affected by it.

Take a society where stealing is legal, because the people there all view stealing as something that is not morally wrong. Now, how will this society differ from most? Well, obviously, no stealing laws. People will likely be paranoid. Resources could become more scarce, because there will almost assuredly be people hoarding resources. Violence related to stealing would skyrocket. So, just because they don't think stealing is wrong does not mean that there will be no effect of that belief.

does something lose its "truth value"? well, no, since the value of truth outweighs the value of delusion. it's not like i don't personally value truth, but i don't think truth itself is intrinsically valuable.

overall meaning? i don't know what this means. if you mean to ask if it loses its overall utility then yes! i certainly feel that it does. reasons are outlined above.

truth isn't really useful unless we make it useful.

and are we all in agreement or something that ethics is objective? cause i don't buy that.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Phoenix Wright

[Makaze]

If it existed as an ought, then wouldn't society be better off to hold that morality? Also, it sounds like a high school type thing to bring up, but just because everyone is doing something doesn't mean it's right. If everyone said that the sun is fake, that wouldn't make it fake. The sun would still have an effect on us, we just wouldn't believe it.

Not necessarily. The objective morality we're talking about could have axioms that lead to the conclusion that humanity ought to go extinct. If that morality is correct, and we discover it, do you think that we will commit suicide? No. We will go after our desires before anything else. Suddenly the truth of the matter will mean nothing to anyone.

If you happen to have trouble accepting that objective morality and humanity's interests may be at odds in every way, then you have proven to yourself that I am right.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Makaze

[Irysa]

I'm glad you brought that up because I was going that direction with multiple universes. Our definition of existence is based on tangibility. Something exists if it has tangible form (can be interacted with; i.e. observed). Unicorns don't exist because they don't have tangible form. They are just concepts. If we cannot interact with a particle to observe it then it is not tangible and therefore it does not exist, except in concept. If unicorns exist in another universe but not this one, then the statement "unicorns do not exist except in concept" holds true relative to us. Existence itself is a relative concept.

"Facts" exist without being tangible though. Like I said before, something like a counterfactual or the fact my bike is at the back of my house has no real bearing within reality. I can move the bike, but I can't move the fact. Yet, the fact most definitely exists, and would exist regardless of if anyone was around to observe the universe.

Are they equal to each other? They are not identical, but that is irrelevant. Some people will be ambivalent in either scenario. According to some, the universe that is less enlightened may actually be more desirable

This is a pretty bold claim, so I'd challenge you to actually find someone who would fit into such categories who isn't simply being contrarian. The thing is, the way it's phrased is helpful to my argument, because even if people all may disagree on what truth is, they all value the concept of truth. By simply hypothesising a universe where people are privy to more truths, one can project their own concept of truth onto that universe. So the concept of truth is intrinsically valuable. If we define exactly what truths are known within each universe, there will be disagreement, but that is not the purpose of the argument. Once again, this boils down to a matter of intuition, but I believe the argument holds.

You only think your views are better than theirs because they are your views. Those few who believe otherwise feel the same way about theirs.

Gross oversimplifiation. People can think in degrees that are not entirely subjective, and change their minds, or recognise the validity of others. Rather than a case of "which is better" it is a case of "which makes the most sense", and I'm willing to accept rational positions. I arrived at this position after thinking about it. The reason I don't accept such relativist or nihilist mantra is because it essentially just throws in the towel when it comes to the exchange of ideas. "There's too many opposing ideas, we can't consolidate them all, they're all correct/wrong!". They also simply doesn't follow logically without completely ignoring/rejecting baseline moral intuitions. Whilst this is hardly uncommon as far as anti-realist arguments go, it makes no more sense to deny that you can see than it does to deny moral intuition.

Asking Phoenix if he would choose one universe for himself as proof that they are not equal is absurd. Even if he and nearly everyone chooses to agree with you and you all enlighten that universe based on your values, that still would not establish your view's supremacy unless you subscribe to the "might makes right" argument you decried earlier ("it is better because you converted the opposition" is congruent to "it is better because you physically beat them"). The concept that getting him to agree with you will make your view more objective is an appeal to might.

I did not ask if he would choose one universe for himself, and the argument is not "proof". It is a question meant to cause consideration and invite a response, which it has.

As for the second point, once again, I never claimed that people agreeing with me meant I was correct. The point is to engage to further understandings and viewpoints. At no point have I even implied that someone agreeing with me meant my view was objective. This is a complete distraction from the actual question, sophistry at it's finest.

huh. i guess i never really thought about this before, but i think i disagree. i certainly feel the pursuit of truth is necessary, at least, but i don't think has intrinsic value. knowing the truth doesn't do much good, it's more how we as people act with that knowledge. we choose to make some truths meaningful and others meaningless.

If truth did not have intrinsic value there would be no worth in pursuing it. Having access to truth broaden's one's views and increases possibilities in ways that are simply non-existant to those without truth. Simplying knowing is powerful, even if nothing is done, because it facilitates potential. One may say this simply applies to "knowledge", but I ask of you, what is "knowledge" without "truth"? For something to be "knowledge" there must be some element of truth within it, else it is not knowledge at all. Even things that are categorically wrong, such as "heavier objects fall faster than light objects", something Aristotle got completely wrong, have some basis in truth; lighter objects tend to have a higher amount of air resistance when falling.

depends. does the universe with a greater understanding of truths utilize the knowledge? cause if they don't, they're just as good as the ignorant one!

I disagree, but to demonstrate it a little better, let's reform the question a little.

The people of Universe X have a greater understanding of truth.

The people Universe Y have a lesser understanding of truth and for whatever reason can never gain access to the truth that Universe X has.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Irysa

[Makaze]

"Facts" exist without being tangible though. Like I said before, something like a counterfactual or the fact my bike is at the back of my house has no real bearing within reality. I can move the bike, but I can't move the fact. Yet, the fact most definitely exists, and would exist regardless of if anyone was around to observe the universe.

That's... False. I don't know how else to say it. Facts, especially facts about the physical world, are absolutely tangible. Facts are defined by being indisputable. Something that is intangible is disputable in every way. If you cannot observe your bike in any way, it is not at the back of your house. It has no existence relative to your house, or to you. It is Russel's teapot.

This is a pretty bold claim, so I'd challenge you to actually find someone who would fit into such categories who isn't simply being contrarian. The thing is, the way it's phrased is helpful to my argument, because even if people all may disagree on what truth is, they all value the concept of truth. By simply hypothesising a universe where people are privy to more truths, one can project their own concept of truth onto that universe. So the concept of truth is intrinsically valuable. If we define exactly what truths are known within each universe, there will be disagreement, but that is not the purpose of the argument. Once again, this boils down to a matter of intuition, but I believe the argument holds.

I know a few people who would prefer the unenlightened world for a few reasons. One of them is that it would be less boring from their perspective. I don't mean they think the unenlightened people are correct about things. They think that people being wrong is better relative to their desires.

Gross oversimplifiation. People can think in degrees that are not entirely subjective, and change their minds, or recognise the validity of others. Rather than a case of "which is better" it is a case of "which makes the most sense", and I'm willing to accept rational positions. I arrived at this position after thinking about it. The reason I don't accept such relativist or nihilist mantra is because it essentially just throws in the towel when it comes to the exchange of ideas. "There's too many opposing ideas, we can't consolidate them all, they're all correct/wrong!". They also simply doesn't follow logically without completely ignoring/rejecting baseline moral intuitions. Whilst this is hardly uncommon as far as anti-realist arguments go, it makes no more sense to deny that you can see than it does to deny moral intuition.

Positions that seem rational to you. The nihilist view is perfectly rational from my perspective. It seems irrational from yours. It comes back to the same problem: There is no objective standard to compare to. There is only what we can agree to compare it to. If we can't agree on what we're comparing to then we are dealing in blue and orange instead of black and white, to put it one way.

I did not ask if he would choose one universe for himself, and the argument is not "proof". It is a question meant to cause consideration and invite a response, which it has.

As for the second point, once again, I never claimed that people agreeing with me meant I was correct. The point is to engage to further understandings and viewpoints. At no point have I even implied that someone agreeing with me meant my view was objective. This is a complete distraction from the actual question, sophistry at it's finest.

If you did not imply those things, then you literally asked him what his personal opinion was. Not about what is objective, but what his subjective view is. It's off-topic. I was giving you the benefit of the doubt on that.

[Phoenix Wright]

If truth did not have intrinsic value there would be no worth in pursuing it.

is lacking intrinsic value lacking value altogether?

Having access to truth broaden's one's views and increases possibilities in ways that are simply non-existant to those without truth. Simply knowing is powerful, even if nothing is done, because it facilitates potential. One may say this simply applies to "knowledge", but I ask of you, what is "knowledge" without "truth"? For something to be "knowledge" there must be some element of truth within it, else it is not knowledge at all.

potential doesn't mean anything if one doesn't utilize it either. i'm not arguing truth has no value, i think. am i misunderstanding what intrinsic value is in a philosophical setting? i understand it as something having value for its own sake. having that thing is inherently valuable. am i interpreting this source correctly?

if so, i don't feel i'm better off simply for knowing truths. it's what i'm able to use those truths for, whatever they may be. it's not like food or sex, where simply having those things is enough. something needs to happen with truth to make it useful. a full tummy is meaningful on its own. pleasure is meaningful on its own. potential is not meaningful on its own.

The people of Universe X have a greater understanding of truth.

The people Universe Y have a lesser understanding of truth and for whatever reason can never gain access to the truth that Universe X has.

the heisenberg uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics can perhaps chime in. it puts fundamental constraints on what there is to know in terms of the precision we can gather for a pair of a particle's properties, like its position and momentum, or somewhat more abstractly its time-energy relation.

so actually it's not that we can't know with high precision a particles position and momentum--it's that it's all there is to know. so, if we relate this to your hypothetical, universe y is not at a more limited understanding (cause how would they know anyway?), there are simply less truths in that universe. universe y isn't constrained in its knowledge because universe x exists, it's simply that in universe y, that's all that they can know.

the question wasn't changed at all if you think of it this way.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Phoenix Wright

[Irysa]

That's... False. I don't know how else to say it. Facts, especially facts about the physical world, are absolutely tangible. Facts are defined by being indisputable. Something that is intangible is disputable in every way. If you cannot observe your bike in any way, it is not at the back of your house. It has no existence relative to your house, or to you. It is Russel's teapot.

You're misunderstanding. The bike is at the back of the house. That's observable. But the "fact" the bike is at the back of the house is not observable. I'm talking about the fact as a separate entity. We can move the bike, but we cannot move the fact. The fact is.

I think I may have chosen the wrong word when I said "observe", because for the purpose of the argument I'm already assuming that the bike is there, which presupposes an observer for many people. I'm not good at ontology. But regardless, I'm pretty sure any realist will simply accept the axiom that there is a physical universe that exists with or without an observer. Or at least, a conscious observer, the whole "matter is consciousness" stuff is beyond me.

I know a few people who would prefer the unenlightened world for a few reasons. One of them is that it would be less boring from their perspective. I don't mean they think the unenlightened people are correct about things. They think that people being wrong is better relative to their desires.

I did not ask if someone wanted to live within the world though. The question was "are they equal?" And it then begs the question "why are they not equal?". You claim it's merely a difference of physical nature, but the question is vague enough to facilitate this; Phoenix himself suggested a world that could be otherwise identical, since people simply don't act on those truths.

Positions that seem rational to you. The nihilist view is perfectly rational from my perspective. It seems irrational from yours. It comes back to the same problem: There is no objective standard to compare to. There is only what we can agree to compare it to. If we can't agree on what we're comparing to then we are dealing in blue and orange instead of black and white, to put it one way.

Again, what is irrational about viewing moral sense as indicative of an objective morality? If the response is "moral senses differ between individuals", one can yet again point to individual separate and unique sensations from other senses. I'm getting the feeling that you don't even accept reality exists non relatively, which would be the real crux of the issue here, and I cannot fathom what reason one has to disbelieve things you have good reason to believe.

If you did not imply those things, then you literally asked him what his personal opinion was. Not about what is objective, but what his subjective view is. It's off-topic. I was giving you the benefit of the doubt on that.

Note the quote I responded to.

knowing the truth doesn't matter if people don't accept it.

This is clearly a view, and I am testing that view.

potential doesn't mean anything if one doesn't utilize it either. i'm not arguing truth has no value, i think. am i misunderstanding what intrinsic value is in a philosophical setting? i understand it as something having value for its own sake. having that thing is inherently valuable. am i interpreting this source correctly?

if so, i don't feel i'm better off simply for knowing truths. it's what i'm able to use those truths for, whatever they may be. it's not like food or sex, where simply having those things is enough. something needs to happen with truth to make it useful. a full tummy is meaningful on its own. pleasure is meaningful on its own. potential is not meaningful on its own.

You're following it correctly, but the point I'm trying to make is that truth presupposes them. If you lack the truths that enable one to eat or have sex, then you have no potential to do those actions. Truth enables, that's why it's intrinsic.

the heisenberg uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics can perhaps chime in. it puts fundamental constraints on the precision we can know a pair of a particle's properties, like its position and momentum, or somewhat more abstractly its time-energy relation.

it's not that we can't know with high precision a particles position and momentum--it's that it's all there is to know. so, if we relate this to your hypothetical, universe y is not at a more limited understanding (cause how would they know anyway?), there are simply less truths in that universe. universe y isn't constrained in its knowledge because universe x exists, it's simply that in universe y, that's all that they can know.

the question wasn't changed at all if you think of it this way.

I was thinking more like an arbitrary alien entity or deity restricting their progress rather than neccesarily there simply being less truths. I didn't specify so as to get away from ethical arguments about restricting truth, I wanted to focus on the concept.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Irysa

[Blaze The Great]

does something lose its "truth value"? well, no, since the value of truth outweighs the value of delusion. it's not like i don't personally value truth, but i don't think truth itself is intrinsically valuable.

overall meaning? i don't know what this means. if you mean to ask if it loses its overall utility then yes! i certainly feel that it does. reasons are outlined above.

truth isn't really useful unless we make it useful.

and are we all in agreement or something that ethics is objective? cause i don't buy that.

Alright, we've come to the conclusion that something is a fact regardless of our beliefs. Now, certain facts have direct effects on our lives. So, if morality is "factual" (hypotheticslly, of course) then what we believe about us will affect our lives, regardless of the beliefs being held.

Also, I don't think we have agreed on objective ethics. On the contrary, I think that ethics are very subjective because they change cross-culturally.

Not necessarily. The objective morality we're talking about could have axioms that lead to the conclusion that humanity ought to go extinct. If that morality is correct, and we discover it, do you think that we will commit suicide? No. We will go after our desires before anything else. Suddenly the truth of the matter will mean nothing to anyone.If you happen to have trouble accepting that objective morality and humanity's interests may be at odds in every way, then you have proven to yourself that I am right.

It seems like we've come back to square 1, because we already had reached the premise that in this scenario people aren't following the objective morality.

Anyway, if we come to a conclusion, it's not guaranteed that we will follow it. Also, unless self-destruction is the best path for humanity to take, then humanity's extinction would virtually destroy the premise of morality. Animals cannot be moral; they can only act on instinct, so there would be no reason for morality to exist if not for humanity (unless you believe in a God, but that's a different debate).

I admit though, that was a good point, and it made me think for a while.

[Phoenix Wright]

You're following it correctly, but the point I'm trying to make is that truth presupposes them. If you lack the truths that enable one to eat or have sex, then you have no potential to do those actions. Truth enables, that's why it's intrinsic.

I was thinking more like an arbitrary alien entity or deity restricting their progress rather than neccesarily there simply being less truths. I didn't specify so as to get away from ethical arguments about restricting truth, I wanted to focus on the concept.

then, truth is actually more of a foundation for intrinsic valuables than something having an intrinsic value? i feel like part of the definition of something having intrinsic value means that it has value regardless of other things. if food and sex require truths to have value, aren't those things actually not intrinsic? specifically, what truths enable one to eat and have sex? how concrete or abstract are these truths that we're talking about?

and to reiterate, food is to hunger, pleasure is to sex, and potential is to truth? how is potential meaningful by itself?

i think the scenario is loaded. it doesn't really matter how universe y can't acquire those truths--the fact remains that there remains a set of truths that they can know, and set a truths that might as well not be truths at all. an unobtainable truth certainly holds no value. and i've already said how i've felt both about the scenario otherwise.

Alright, we've come to the conclusion that something is a fact regardless of our beliefs. Now, certain facts have direct effects on our lives. So, if morality is "factual" (hypotheticslly, of course) then what we believe about us will affect our lives, regardless of the beliefs being held.

Also, I don't think we have agreed on objective ethics. On the contrary, I think that ethics are very subjective because they change cross-culturally.

how? if taking another's life is objectively wrong, but no one accepts it (ie, the belief is universally contrary to the truth), how will this affect anything? i don't see how a hypothetical objective morality will actually change us unless we use the information to change us.

and i asked olwen this question, but he either missed it or ignored it: if everyone had the same culture, would ethics be objective?

[Irysa]

then, truth is actually more of a foundation for intrinsic valuables than something having an intrinsic value? i feel like part of the definition of something having intrinsic value means that it has value regardless of other things. if food and sex require truths to have value, aren't those things actually not intrinsic? specifically, what truths enable one to eat and have sex? how concrete or abstract are these truths that we're talking about?

Well, I don't consider food or sex to be intrinsically valuable, and I didn't say as such. I was merely trying to demonstrate how truth presupposes things I thought you were implying were intrinsically valuable.

and to reiterate, food is to hunger, pleasure is to sex, and potential is to truth? how is potential meaningful by itself?

I'm probably doing a bad job of explaining this, but without potential there can't even be anything. I don't think I can adequately explain why a non-universe of absoloute nothingness is neccessarily "worse" than one of not absoloute nothingness, because it sort of follows on the same principles I outlined earlier of how the value of a conscious being's life is immeasurable (note that I'm not saying the universe is conscious, just that it's valuable because of potential). There's a degree of intuition involved because I've made the stipulation that "there are things of immeasurable value", so no matter how further I attempt to explain the reasonings, if you reject the premise it doesn't float.

If you don't accept "lives have objective value because even if our personal meaning is created within ourselves, the raw potential of the sensations we as intelligent, conscious beings can derive from existence is so powerful and vast that it's value is immeasurable", then you're probably not going to accept a similar argument for the universe, since I'm essentially saying "the universe exists because of truths outlining it's existance, and without those truths there could be no potential for anything to ever occur" and justify it due to it being intuitively better versus complete nonexistance. Even hedonism has to have things "exist" for pleasure to be what is "good", even in a relative sense.

I think that innately, truth is so immeasurably valuable that knowing truth is in itself is part of The Good, even if one does not act on it. In some ways I feel very attracted to the Socratic perspective on Human Evil, in that all Evil is a result of ignorance, and if you truly understand The Good then you can only do that...but I realise that's kind of a tangent and my attraction to it is most definitely due to it being so idyllic and romantic.

i think the scenario is loaded. it doesn't really matter how universe y can't acquire those truths--the fact remains that there remains a set of truths that they can know, and set a truths that might as well not be truths at all. an unobtainable truth certainly holds no value. and i've already said how i've felt both about the scenario otherwise.

Again, I suppose the crux here is the disagreement on whether or not the truths are mind independant or not. From my understanding, to be a realist means you assert that those truths definitely still exist within Universe Y, even if they're out of reach for the people, wheras you're asserting they don't exist without being known.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Irysa

[Blaze The Great]

how? if taking another's life is objectively wrong, but no one accepts it (ie, the belief is universally contrary to the truth), how will this affect anything? i don't see how a hypothetical objective morality will actually change us unless we use the information to change us.

and i asked olwen this question, but he either missed it or ignored it: if everyone had the same culture, would ethics be objective?

I think it's safe to assume that if murder was legal, the rate at which murder occurs in that society would be higher than said rate in a society where murder is forbidden. Now, I'm not an expert on crime's effects on a population, but I'm sure that there would be some such as overall dissatisfaction, increased fear, increased paranoia, more revenge/unprovoked attacks, etc. All just personal speculation, but none of it seems unreasonable. So yes, there would be effects, most likely adverse ones, on a population that accepted murder.

Also, I do think those would be objective ethics. Not even out of chance, but out of necessity. Again, as I continuously bring up, from the minimal research I have done, ethics are general principles for proper conduct, and so they are judged extra-personally.

[Phoenix Wright]

I think it's safe to assume that if murder was legal, the rate at which murder occurs in that society would be higher than said rate in a society where murder is forbidden. Now, I'm not an expert on crime's effects on a population, but I'm sure that there would be some such as overall dissatisfaction, increased fear, increased paranoia, more revenge/unprovoked attacks, etc. All just personal speculation, but none of it seems unreasonable. So yes, there would be effects, most likely adverse ones, on a population that accepted murder.

Also, I do think those would be objective ethics. Not even out of chance, but out of necessity. Again, as I continuously bring up, from the minimal research I have done, ethics are general principles for proper conduct, and so they are judged extra-personally.

sorry for my being unclear--by "not affect anything," i meant what you kinda already said earlier. just because we come to a conclusion doesn't mean we'll follow it. if a society accepts taking people's lives willy-nilly, objective morality stating it's wrong, and the people don't change, does that conclusion actually affect anything? i know that the results of that society in terms of lives lost will differ from from cultures we know of currently, but that part's not important for the thought experiment.

i see.

Again, I suppose the crux here is the disagreement on whether or not the truths are mind independant or not. From my understanding, to be a realist means you assert that those truths definitely still exist within Universe Y, even if they're out of reach for the people, wheras you're asserting they don't exist without being known.

i didn't explicitly say those truths didn't exist. i said they might as well not exist.

but, if you want me to bite, what i can say that if those in uni x choose not to do anything with the greater body of truths, the truths don't mean anything. no matter how you paint the scenario, my fundamental answer is the same...the way i view truths is fundamentally different from how you view truths (currently), so no matter how this particular picture is drawn, my answer can't change.

Well, I don't consider food or sex to be intrinsically valuable, and I didn't say as such. I was merely trying to demonstrate how truth presupposes things I thought you were implying were intrinsically valuable.

sorry. the link i posted had an extensive list of things considered to be intrinsic truths by a number of philosophers (it didn't give many details after the list), so i sorta thought you conformed to that. still, do you feel this way about truths and other things you perceive to have intrinsic value? is truth a foundation for intrinsic value in your world view?

I'm probably doing a bad job of explaining this, but without potential there can't even be anything. I don't think I can adequately explain why a non-universe of absoloute nothingness is neccessarily "worse" than one of not absoloute nothingness, because it sort of follows on the same principles I outlined earlier of how the value of a conscious being's life is immeasurable (note that I'm not saying the universe is conscious, just that it's valuable because of potential). There's a degree of intuition involved because I've made the stipulation that "there are things of immeasurable value", so no matter how further I attempt to explain the reasonings, if you reject the premise it doesn't float.

If you don't accept "lives have objective value because even if our personal meaning is created within ourselves, the raw potential of the sensations we as intelligent, conscious beings can derive from existence is so powerful and vast that it's value is immeasurable", then you're probably not going to accept a similar argument for the universe, since I'm essentially saying "the universe exists because of truths outlining it's existance, and without those truths there could be no potential for anything to ever occur" and justify it due to it being intuitively better versus complete nonexistance. Even hedonism has to have things "exist" for pleasure to be what is "good", even in a relative sense.

an interesting viewpoint. perhaps i've just never prodded anybody enough, but i've never heard the existence of the universe being justified in this way before!

if truths can exist even if there are not conscience beings to recognize them, then sure, i think i'd agree with you. but...i think "truths" only exist because we exist. how do experts feel about this? for now, i think we'll have to agree to disagree. i don't accept that statement.

[Chiki]

Second paragraph: Moral error theory by definition = the view that there are no intrinsic ethical truths and that ethics is constructed in error. The statement "moral error theory is true" is an ethical statement since it is a statement about ethics which is what "ethical" means. Thus, moral error theory is an objective view on morality, though it claims not to construct morality. Thus, moral error theory is self-refuting.

Error theory says that there are no moral properties. "Moral error theory" is not a moral property. So "moral error theory is true" is not self-refuting.

Also, try to define what is "good" in the moral relativist view for us. For example, take the sentence "killing Jews in Nazi Germany is good." Can you define for us what good means? It obviously has to have the relativity thing in its definition.

how? if taking another's life is objectively wrong, but no one accepts it (ie, the belief is universally contrary to the truth), how will this affect anything? i don't see how a hypothetical objective morality will actually change us unless we use the information to change us.

and i asked olwen this question, but he either missed it or ignored it: if everyone had the same culture, would ethics be objective?

Well, it gives us good reason to believe that ethics is objective but that's all.

That's... False. I don't know how else to say it. Facts, especially facts about the physical world, are absolutely tangible. Facts are defined by being indisputable. Something that is intangible is disputable in every way. If you cannot observe your bike in any way, it is not at the back of your house. It has no existence relative to your house, or to you. It is Russel's teapot.

...Wrong. Math is intangible but it's not disputable in any way. =_= Propositions (facts) are intangible abstract objects according to some views.

Strongly Disagree. Truth is intrinsically valuable.

Compare two hypothetical universes. In one, people are more enlightened and less ignorant than the other.

Can you honestly say that on principle, the universe with greater understanding of truths is equal to the other?

Sure. In an ethics class I came up with an argument which proved that truth wasn't intrinsically valuable:

Imagine a possible world with a "truth machine." It knows every single fact about that world, (which atom moved where, in which direction, at which time, etc.). It probably knows like 10^10000000000000000000000000000000000 truths or something. There are no beings whatsoever in this world, but it's filled with stars and planets and atoms and such, on a similar scale to our universe.

Now imagine our world with our universe and such. Imagine the truth machine knew just enough truths to make his world have more intrinsic value than our world.

Which world is more valuable? Obviously world 2.

Edited July 21, 2015 by Chiki