Is there an objective morality?

[Blaze The Great]

Whatever benefits me personally.

Sounds more like ethical egoism to me.

[Makaze]

Sounds more like ethical egoism to me.

Meta-ethically, I'm a relativist. Ethically, I'm an anarchist. No matter what system of morals I chose it would have to be one that pleased me the most by definition.

[Blaze The Great]

One that would benefit you the most, or just one that you enjoyed the most?

[Makaze]

One that would benefit you the most, or just one that you enjoyed the most?

One and the same. I don't like any definition of benefit if I don't prefer it.

I'm a kind of advanced hedonist. I have what others might call moral preferences, but I don't delude myself into thinking it is because they are correct. I have moral views simply because they make me happy.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Makaze

[Blaze The Great]

Hmm. Seems like a reasonable view for moral relativism to hold. I myself don't personally hold it, but it holds some merit.

[Chiki]

I have to trouble believing you're actually not reading this but here goes again.

1) I subscribe to meta-ethical relativism, not normative relativism.

2) I use an individualist scale for my own decisions.

Meta-ethical moral relativists believe not only that people disagree about moral issues, but that terms such as "good", "bad", "right" and "wrong" do not stand subject to universal truth conditions at all; rather, they are relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of an individual or a group of people. The American anthropologist William Sumner was an influential advocate of this view. In his 1906 work Folkways he argues that what people consider right and wrong is entirely shaped by the traditions, customs and practices of their culture. Moreover, since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.

So let me ask again: are you ok with not jailing Nazis for killing Jews?

One and the same. I don't like any definition of benefit if I don't prefer it.

I'm a kind of advanced hedonist. I have what others might call moral preferences, but I don't delude myself into thinking it is because they are correct. I have moral views simply because they make me happy.

Hedonism is also a meta-ethical view in that it says pleasure is has intrinsic value; thus, it is a moral realist view and contradicts moral relativism... being a hedonist and a meta-ethical moral relativist at the same time is literally nonsense and a sign that one is deeply confused about basic philosophy.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Chiki

[Naughx]

Hey lets bring a hypothetical alien invasion to this...

Is it wrong for aliens to come and colonize "inferior" beings? (I'm just curious if your "morality" applies to them)

But I really do think ethics vary on a case-by-case basis.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Naughx

[Chiki]

Hey lets bring a hypothetical alien invasion to this...

Is it wrong for aliens to come and colonize "inferior" beings? (I'm just curious if your "morality" applies to them)

But I really do think ethics vary on a case-by-case basis.

On the moral realist view, it is unjust, since ethics applies to every living being.

On the moral relativist view, if you're a meta-ethical or normative moral relativist, then no it's acceptable lol.

If you think ethics vary on a case-by-case basis from a moral realist standpoint (ethics are objectively true AND they vary case-by-case), that view would be universally rejected by every philosopher as being ad hoc or arbitrary.

[Rapier]

I still can't see how you can make ethical claims if moral error theory says there are no moral truths (thus, no ethical truths)? There would be nothing wrong (or right) with jews being killed by nazis, through this viewpoint."Who are we to tell them they are wrong? They think they are right".

[Makaze]

Meta-ethical moral relativists believe not only that people disagree about moral issues, but that terms such as "good", "bad", "right" and "wrong" do not stand subject to universal truth conditions at all; rather, they are relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of an individual or a group of people. The American anthropologist William Sumner was an influential advocate of this view. In his 1906 work Folkways he argues that what people consider right and wrong is entirely shaped by the traditions, customs and practices of their culture. Moreover, since there is no higher moral standard than the local mores of a culture, no trans-cultural judgement about the rightness or wrongness of a culture's mores can be justified.

So let me ask again: are you ok with not jailing Nazis for killing Jews?

Hedonism is also a meta-ethical view in that it says pleasure is has intrinsic value; thus, it is a moral realist view and contradicts moral relativism... being a hedonist and a meta-ethical moral relativist at the same time is literally nonsense and a sign that one is deeply confused about basic philosophy.

I already answered you several times. Relative to me personally, it is not okay. Relative to someone who believes in it, it is okay. When I make decisions, I will use my own relativity, not theirs. The question is loaded. I tell you there can be no is no objective statement, you ask for an objective statement anyway. I give you a relative statement, you ask for an objective statement anyway. I'm not sure what part of that is confusing to you so I can't make it clearer than that.

I disagree with you on hedonism. It is not necessarily meta-ethical, it's just plain ethical. I can subscribe to hedonist values relatively instead of objectively: in fact, I believe I have to do so. It's one of the best ways to describe how I make my decisions. If that still doesn't satisfy you, I qualified my hedonism as a kind of hedonism instead of pure hedonism because I was aware it wasn't exactly the same.

You don't need to keep trying to scare me away from the section. You can argue the subject instead of the words. You can relax. It's okay.

I still can't see how you can make ethical claims if moral error theory says there are no moral truths (thus, no ethical truths)? There would be nothing wrong (or right) with jews being killed by nazis, through this viewpoint."Who are we to tell them they are wrong? They think they are right".

I believe Chiki is trying to humiliate me because of a grudge. It has little to do with his believing either way.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Makaze

[Chiki]

I already answered you several times. Relative to me personally, it is not okay. Relative to someone who believes in it, it is okay. When I make decisions, I will use my own relativity, not theirs. The question is loaded. I tell you there can be no is no objective statement, you ask for an objective statement anyway. I give you a relative statement, you ask for an objective statement anyway. I'm not sure what part of that is confusing to you so I can't make it clearer than that.

I disagree with you on hedonism. It is not necessarily meta-ethical, it's just plain ethical. I can subscribe to hedonist values relatively instead of objectively: in fact, I believe I have to do so. It's one of the best ways to describe how I make my decisions. If that still doesn't satisfy you, I qualified my hedonism as a kind of hedonism instead of pure hedonism because I was aware it wasn't exactly the same.

You don't need to keep trying to scare me away from the section. You can argue the subject instead of the words. You can relax. It's okay.

...No, any ethical view necessarily makes a claim about meta-ethics (apart from the most basic version of moral relativism I guess).

Hedonism is a school of thought that argues that pleasure is the primary or most important intrinsic good.

To say that hedonism has intrinsic value is to say that it is objectively valuable, and therefore hedonism by definition is a meta-ethical claim.

I'm not trying to scare you away at all lol, and I have no grudge. I just point out whenever someone says something incorrect, and you do that more often than most people. Far more often in fact, especially on Serious Discussion. It's my job as someone who knows this stuff better than most people.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Chiki

[Naughx]

If you think ethics vary on a case-by-case basis from a moral realist standpoint (ethics are objectively true AND they vary case-by-case), that view would be universally rejected by every philosopher as being ad hoc or arbitrary.

But ethics are a human conception in the first place! So they're arbitrary.

They're driven by emotions for the most part. (Empathy)

Edited July 20, 2015 by Naughx

[Makaze]

...No, any ethical view necessarily makes a claim about meta-ethics (apart from the most basic version of moral relativism I guess).

To say that hedonism has intrinsic value is to say that it is objectively valuable, and therefore hedonism by definition is a meta-ethical claim.

I'm not trying to scare you away at all lol, and I have no grudge. I just point out whenever someone says something incorrect, and you do that more often than most people. Far more often in fact, especially on Serious Discussion. It's my job as someone who knows this stuff better than most people.

Agree to disagree. The entire point of it being meta-ethics is that it transcends ethics.

To say that hedonism has intrinsic value to me is to say that it objectively has intrinsic value to me. Not that it objectively has value relative to others. When I say intrinsic, I mean valuable in and of itself with no further justification required to satisfy me personally, not a fact that everyone must observe equally.

Come now.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Makaze

[Rapier]

I believe Chiki is trying to humiliate me because of a grudge. It has little to do with his believing either way.

It's funny how he's intentionally avoiding my post. In fact, I don't see how this doesn't put moral error theory into check.

From what I understood from you, Makaze, you claim that morals are relative because I think x is ok, and you think x is not ok, or vice-versa. That discrepancy is used in your conclusion for stating that there is no such a thing as an objective morality. But is it not possible that one of us is wrong about something that exists independently of what we think or believe? This argument for moral relativism is very simple and easily refutable, because the conclusion can be false (so the argument is invalid). To say that morals are relative, you need to say that morals have a relative nature in themselves, but that would blow up your argument completely because then morality becomes an objective concept, not a relative one. Your position seems indefensable to me.

[Makaze]

It's funny how he's intentionally avoiding my post. In fact, I don't see how this doesn't put moral error theory into check.

From what I understood from you, Makaze, you claim that morals are relative because I think x is ok, and you think x is not ok, or vice-versa. That discrepancy is used in your conclusion for stating that there is no such a thing as an objective morality. But is it not possible that one of us is wrong about something that exists independently of what we think or believe? This argument for moral relativism is very simple and easily refutable, because the conclusion can be false (so the argument is invalid). To say that morals are relative, you need to say that morals have a relative nature in themselves, but that would blow up your argument completely because then morality becomes an objective concept, not a relative one. Your position seems indefensable to me.

There is an is-ought barrier that cannot be transcended in a meaningful way. Ought a particular thing be the case? Okay, assume so. Is it the case? If not, and if not everyone believes it ought to be the case, then what effect does it have on reality?

[Rapier]

There is an is-ought barrier that cannot be transcended in a meaningful way. Ought a particular thing be the case? Okay, assume so. Is it the case? If not, and if not everyone believes it ought to be the case, then what effect does it have on reality?

Ok, I confess that intelectual jargon gives me the BSOD and I need to reread twice (because I'm stupid and I haven't slept well lately), so I might have missed something, but let's go:

I agree there is an is-ought barrier that can't be transcended, as much as we try to reach the best "is" possibility for the "ought" we are pursuing. For example, the law is not perfect, but it does try to be as similar to the idealized perfect sense of justice as possible. But this wasn't my point. It's noise for the discussion, honestly.

I haven't seen a positive claim from you that backs up the affirmation that morality is relative for its own nature, you still did not show that it is the case (you only said that the discrepancy means moral relativism is true, but I have demonstrated how your argument is invalid, so it is not acceptable). But for you to show it is the case, you need to say that moral relativism is objectively true... which blows your position altogether. This is why I think your position is indefensable from the beginning.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Rapier

[Erdall]

Just because not all of Nazism is totally extreme beliefs does not mean that none of it is. Typically normal ideas (restoring your country to greatness) do not cancel out your thoughts of genocide lingering just beyond. In addition to that, it does not matter the quantity of people who share the beliefs, but the quality of beliefs that are held. And Nazi beliefs are very bad, overall.

Indeed, they are overall. Never said otherwise, just ... don't let yourself provoked by those who could follow such 'dangerous' ideology anyway because they feel like they can state about it. Another thing is when any sort of pure sociopath can do anything terribly sadist, well ... call the 091 fast, lol

I have no personal problem with NK, but my language is often blunt. I've seen people saying we should destroy them now, and honestly that's a load of garbage. So yeah.

Terrible idea. Didn't they hear anytime of "thinking first, shooting later" if need be? Come on, such brainless people that it could shock myself if I hear that!

Edited July 20, 2015 by Erdall

[Chiki]

Agree to disagree. The entire point of it being meta-ethics is that it transcends ethics.

To say that hedonism has intrinsic value to me is to say that it objectively has intrinsic value to me. Not that it objectively has value relative to others. When I say intrinsic, I mean valuable in and of itself with no further justification required to satisfy me personally, not a fact that everyone must observe equally.

Come now.

It doesn't transcend ethics lol, because hedonism makes a meta-ethical claim.

Also, that's not hedonism, that's merely moral subjectivism.

It's funny how he's intentionally avoiding my post. In fact, I don't see how this doesn't put moral error theory into check.

From what I understood from you, Makaze, you claim that morals are relative because I think x is ok, and you think x is not ok, or vice-versa. That discrepancy is used in your conclusion for stating that there is no such a thing as an objective morality. But is it not possible that one of us is wrong about something that exists independently of what we think or believe? This argument for moral relativism is very simple and easily refutable, because the conclusion can be false (so the argument is invalid). To say that morals are relative, you need to say that morals have a relative nature in themselves, but that would blow up your argument completely because then morality becomes an objective concept, not a relative one. Your position seems indefensable to me.

What post are you talking about? I'll reply to whatever you want me to, but your argument is probably easy and trivial to respond to.

[Rapier]

What post are you talking about? I'll reply to whatever you want me to, but your argument is probably easy and trivial to respond to.

Woah, calm down, Gilgamesh. I'm probably wrong about this, but I want to be educated.

You asked him if he believes that nazi killing jews is acceptable, and it seems from your post that you don't. But how can you even judge the case, if moral error theory says moral claims aren't even capable of being judged as true or false?

[Chiki]

Woah, calm down, Gilgamesh. I'm probably wrong about this, but I want to be educated.

You asked him if he believes that nazi killing jews is acceptable, and it seems from your post that you don't. But how can you even judge the case, if moral error theory says moral claims aren't even capable of being judged as true or false?

I could invent ethics. I already said this one several posts ago which you chose to forget...

Edited July 20, 2015 by Chiki

[Blaze The Great]

@ Chiki (in response to your post about objective, case-by-case ethics): That's what I expected but thanks for answering.

@Erdall Your moral arguments have quickly faded. I appreciate your contributions, but I think our debate is over.

[Irysa]

There is an is-ought barrier that cannot be transcended in a meaningful way. Ought a particular thing be the case? Okay, assume so. Is it the case? If not, and if not everyone believes it ought to be the case, then what effect does it have on reality?

You sound incredibly defeatist when you say this. Slavery would not have been abolished, women's suffrage would never have occurred and the civil right's movement would never have started if we all simply just shrugged at the injustices in the world and said "well maybe it ought to be different, but it just isn't!"

Edited July 20, 2015 by Irysa

[Makaze]

Ok, I confess that intelectual jargon gives me the BSOD and I need to reread twice (because I'm stupid and I haven't slept well lately), so I might have missed something, but let's go:

I agree there is an is-ought barrier that can't be transcended, as much as we try to reach the best "is" possibility for the "ought" we are pursuing. For example, the law is not perfect, but it does try to be as similar to the idealized perfect sense of justice as possible. But this wasn't my point. It's noise for the discussion, honestly.

I haven't seen a positive claim from you that backs up the affirmation that morality is relative for its own nature, you still did not show that it is the case (you only said that the discrepancy means moral relativism is true, but I have demonstrated how your argument is invalid, so it is not acceptable). But for you to show it is the case, you need to say that moral relativism is objectively true... which blows your position altogether. This is why I think your position is indefensable from the beginning.

Moral relativism is the logical conclusion when you determine that the is-ought barrier exists. What you're suggesting is that relativity itself is paradoxical. It may not be intuitive but it can be true that something is neither true nor false. Take the liar's paradox, which goes: "This statement is false." It is defensible that [it is true that] the statement is neither true nor false.

You sound incredibly defeatist when you say this. Slavery would not have been abolished, women's suffrage would never have occurred and the civil right's movement would never have started if we all simply just shrugged at the injustices in the world and said "well maybe it ought to be different, but it just isn't!"

I'm not saying that we should do that. I'm saying what we happen to act on is our relative morality, not some objective axiom. People supported and abolished slavery under relativity, always believing they were behaving morally.

Edited July 20, 2015 by Makaze

[Chiki]

Moral relativism is the logical conclusion when you determine that the is-ought barrier exists.

According to you, what is the truth value of this sentence? "Moral relativism is true."

Edited July 20, 2015 by Chiki

[Blaze The Great]

Moral relativism is the logical conclusion when you determine that the is-ought barrier exists. What you're suggesting is that relativity itself is paradoxical. It may not be intuitive but it can be true that something is neither true nor false. Take the liar's paradox, which goes: "This statement is false." It is defensible that [it is true that] the statement is neither true nor false.

How is it a logical conclusion? To me the logical conclusion seems more like an acceptance of dissonance (i.e. descriptive ethics) rather than moral relativism. Just because you see that x should be but it is not, does not mean that morals are relative. It means that the moral opinions of people on x conflict each other, so we have different perspectives on the morality of x.