Israel/Gaza (Round 3)

[feplus]

Let's try again. Your definition makes agnosticism- uncertainty about god's existence- a kind of atheism. My definition makes agnosticism- uncertainty about god's existence- a kind of theism. Why is one definition preferable over the other?

That is not an empirical claim about god. That is an empirical claim about god's involvement in the natural world. We can empirically test whether the sun ever stood still; we cannot empirically test whether god was responsible.

[dondon151]

Let's try again. Your definition makes agnosticism- uncertainty about god's existence- a kind of atheism. My definition makes agnosticism- uncertainty about god's existence- a kind of theism. Why is one definition preferable over the other?

my definition does not make agnosticism a kind of atheism. read again. read it over and over again until you understand what i actually mean.

That is not an empirical claim about god. That is an empirical claim about god's involvement in the natural world. We can empirically test whether the sun ever stood still; we cannot empirically test whether god was responsible.

if muhammed's revelation is not empirically true, then the islamic interpretation of the abrahamic god does not exist.

you are correct in that we can't test whether god is responsible for these empirical events. however, god's existence is contingent on these empirical events happening. if it were true that the sun stood still, it doesn't mean that the abrahamic god exists, but if the sun never stood still, that's absence of evidence of the abrahamic god's involvement in the natural world, and christianity has specifically defined their god to be involved in the natural world in this manner.

suppose that i claimed, "i believe in a god that will turn bread into doughnuts." if i had a loaf of bread that did magically turn into doughnuts, that doesn't mean that my god exists, because we don't know if he's responsible for that event. but if i had a loaf of bread that did not magically turn into doughnuts, then we can reasonably think that my god doesn't exist.

Edited February 23, 2015 by dondon151

[feplus]

Circular reasoning is tiring. You continue to appeal to your definition as a way to justify your definition. Let's try yet again, this time without any terms that might lead to confusion:

Your definition makes uncertainty about god's existence a kind of atheism. My definition makes uncertainty about god's existence a kind of theism. Why is one definition preferable over the other?

God is not contingent on those events happening. Revelation might be metaphysical inspiration or it might be delusion. Burning bushes might be metaphysical inspiration or they might be natural accidents.

Again: god is not an empirical being. Empirical reasoning does not apply to non-empirical objects. Mathematical platonism, the prevalent position among professional philosophers when it comes to the nature of numbers, is a good example.

[dondon151]

Circular reasoning is tiring. You continue to appeal to your definition as a way to justify your definition. Let's try yet again, this time without any terms that might lead to confusion:

Your definition makes uncertainty about god's existence a kind of atheism. My definition makes uncertainty about god's existence a kind of theism. Why is one definition preferable over the other?

trying to clarify a very basic concept to you is more tiring than untangling circular reasoning, i can assure you of that. neither definition is preferable over the other. this is now the fourth time that i state: agnosticism/gnosticism and atheism/theism are on orthogonal axes. the former is degree of certainty and the latter is a belief in god.

God is not contingent on those events happening. Revelation might be metaphysical inspiration or it might be delusion. Burning bushes might be metaphysical inspiration or they might be natural accidents.

Again: god is not an empirical being. Empirical reasoning does not apply to non-empirical objects. Mathematical platonism, the prevalent position among professional philosophers when it comes to the nature of numbers, is a good example.

so it seems that this is just going to be a slugfest between you asserting that god is purely metaphysical and me asserting that god can be empirically observed. okay.

jesus may or may not have been the son of god. christianity makes the empirical claim that jesus existed along with the metaphysical claim that jesus was the son of god. if jesus never existed, then christianity is false. if christianity is false, then the christian god is false. there may still be a god, but he doesn't contain all of the properties that are attributed to him in the christian faith.

if a religion makes no empirical claims about its deity, then i relent: you would be correct. but as long as a religion makes an empirical claim about its deity, then it can be rejected on empirical grounds.

Edited February 23, 2015 by dondon151

[feplus]

I'm going to pause our song-and-dance here. Despite my pleas, you insist on appealing to your own definition as a way to justify your own definition, and my tolerance for circular reasoning is only so high.

I have tried and failed to educate you on your errors. If this is a subject that genuinely interests you and you'd like further reading, however, I can make some recommendations. Here are the topics we have covered where you have fallen victim to serious- though correctable!- mistakes in judgment:

On the distinction between the empirical and metaphysical

I previously linked to the SEP page on mathematical platonism, and it's an excellent, accessible read. For a literary exploration of this distinction (with historical weight to boot), check out Book VI of Plato's Republic with particular attention paid to the analogy of the divided line. Consider a copy of the Cambridge Companion to ease you through.

On atheism as lacking-belief

As noted earlier, your definition of atheism (and its "four-quadrant" structure) is common among online atheist communities and absent within philosophic discourse. This is not a coincidence. While I have a lowly BA in the discipline, /r/askphilosophy is full of graduate students and PhDs eager to clear up confusions; might be worth asking them. In the meantime, here is a philosophy professor's lucid take (he calls the definition "bizarre"); here is a graduate student's more succinct take.

On Abrahamic god as a metaphysical being

This is a simple definitional confusion, so a more thorough read of the SEP article on atheism and the SEP article on concepts of god should suffice. Also look into some of Plantinga's work.

On the relationship between empirical claims and theological justification

This is a more ambitious topic. On the issue of Christ, you'll want to research how various denominations conceive of his dual-natured ontology (I'm partial to the Orthodox stance). From there I'd recommend readings on metaphysics itself, which should elucidate the disconnect. Lastly, readings into the anthropic principle demonstrate how, even with the empirical / metaphysical disconnect, particular empirical claims can influence the justifiability of theological claims.

While it's palpable you've never studied philosophy or theology at even rudimentary levels, it's also obvious you're a bright guy, too bright to be parroting pseudo-intellectual bromides. Sorry if bowing out of this conversation is a disappointment, but my time is limited and I need to sleep. I wish you luck on your journey and hope you reconsider your stance sooner rather than later.

Edited February 23, 2015 by feplus

[dondon151]

I'm going to pause our song-and-dance here. Despite my pleas, you insist on appealing to your own definition as a way to justify your own definition, and my tolerance for circular reasoning is only so high.

i'm pretty certain that i've answered your question in a satisfactory way; neither definition is preferable over the other.

i'll consider investigating the readings on metaphysics when i have time, but in general i've not found delving into philosophy or theology on more than a cursory level to be productive. it's largely incomprehensible to me.

[Chiki]

Ok, I'm gonna have to agree with feplus on the atheism thing. Agnostics have a lack of belief in God and a lack of belief in the nonexistence of God. This seems to be true. To say that atheism = lack of belief in God is to say that atheists can be agnostic. This just seems intuitively contradictory. Atheists want to say that they believe in the nonexistence of God, which entails a lack of belief in God. But a lack of belief in God doesn't entail the belief of the nonexistence of God (that's atheism).

it's not philosophically possible to prove that there is no god. the nonexistence of gods is not a positive claim.

i hate to use such a trite example, but i'm fairly confident in the statement "there is no teapot in orbit around the earth" even though there is no way to prove that no such teapot exists.

Really? The problem of evil is a classic example of such an attempt. It's convinced a lot of people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

Circular reasoning is tiring. You continue to appeal to your definition as a way to justify your definition. Let's try yet again, this time without any terms that might lead to confusion:

Your definition makes uncertainty about god's existence a kind of atheism. My definition makes uncertainty about god's existence a kind of theism. Why is one definition preferable over the other?

God is not contingent on those events happening. Revelation might be metaphysical inspiration or it might be delusion. Burning bushes might be metaphysical inspiration or they might be natural accidents.

Again: god is not an empirical being. Empirical reasoning does not apply to non-empirical objects. Mathematical platonism, the prevalent position among professional philosophers when it comes to the nature of numbers, is a good example.

Ok (it's a good thing I studied up on metaphysics for my thesis). You really shouldn't be lecturing anyone on metaphysics if you don't even know the basics of abstract objects and God. First, you're confusing God with numbers, which is ridiculous because numbers are causally inert and God is not. Second, you're making a generalization fallacy (just because numbers are "metaphysical" and "not empirical" doesn't mean God isn't empirical).

First of all, let's look at what platonism is. It's the view that numbers are abstract objects. Abstract objects are objects which don't exist in space and time. They are directly causally inert--i.e. they cannot directly causally interact with concrete objects like us.

On the other hand, a Christian like Platinga doesn't want to say that God is an abstract object. Why? Because if God were an abstract object, it would be logically impossible for God to interact with concrete objects (us) in any sort of way. God is omnipotent, so he MUST have some power over concrete objects like us. But then God, if he were an abstract object, would be violating a law of logic. There's no theist philosopher in the world who thinks God can actually break the laws of logic (here is an example of Platinga defending God's existence against the problem of evil based on the fact that God can't defy a law of logic). Theists just think that God is omnipotent within the laws of logic (as powerful as possible, logically).

It doesn't make any sense to say that something is "metaphysical." That's just not a term used in the literature, it's nonsense. You probably mean "metaphysically necessary." Philosophers distinguish between two things: metaphysically possible or necessary? To say that something is metaphysically necessary (like God) is not to say that it is not empirical. The two things are not prima facie contradictory. It just means that God exists in all possible worlds, whether or not he exists empirically. Yes, numbers do exist metaphysically, in all possible worlds according to the platonist, but that doesn't mean all objects that exist metaphysically are empirical (this is a basic generalization fallacy). There's absolutely no doubt that the existence of God is an empirical issue, because God can interact with concrete objects like us, so he is in some causal relationship with us, and so he should be something scientifically questionable just like anything else. To say otherwise is stupid.

Please read up on abstract objects and metaphysical necessity on the SEU. Like this article: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/

Also, platonism is not the prevalent position among philosophers. It seems to be pretty even between platonism and nominalism (nominalism is the view that abstract objects don't exist). http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Accept or lean toward: Platonism 366 / 931 (39.3%) Accept or lean toward: nominalism 351 / 931 (37.7%) Other 214 / 931 (23.0%)

Edited February 25, 2015 by Chiki

[Rapier]

If atheism is defined as the lack of belief in gods (and thus, the belief that there are no gods, because otherwise it'd fall into agnosticism field), and theism is defined as the belief in God(s), how does atheism sustain itself better than religion? Both necessitate beliefs and faith, if this definition is true.

There's absolutely no doubt that the existence of God is an empirical issue, because God can interact with concrete objects like us, so he is in some causal relationship with us, and so he should be something scientifically questionable just like anything else.

Are we even presently capable of analysing God (assuming he exists, of course) on such level?

Really? The problem of evil is a classic example of such an attempt. It's convinced a lot of people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

I should've let dondon handle this, but I'm curious myself: How does one 'prove' something philosophically? From the little I've read, it is only possible to make a plausible enough theory about something.

@dondon

Fair, but I still can not understand how one may claim that religion in general causes wars. An ideology to be responsible for wars requires that its doctrine influences or encourages such practice, we have clear examples such as fascism and communism. I won't delve in the theological field any further because my knowledge about it is little (and should those who know little about theology even be claiming that 'religion causes wars'?), but in order for this generalization to be true, most religions must encourage or influence wars in their doctrine, there must be a high enough sample. Where is the evidence backing up this claim?

Note that I concede on the debate. I dont intend to shift the burden of proof upon you, I'm just curious and wish I could find an answer to this question. Maybe someone can provide it?

Edited February 25, 2015 by Rapier

[Irysa]

@Rapier, I think people are comfortable with the assertion that Religion has, and continues to influence War, and took your statement to be a denial of that, wheras you were being more specific. It is correct that idealogies are at the heart of what causes disagreements, and from that stems war. Rather than saying "Religion doesn't cause war", it may be more appropriate to say "Specifically, there is nothing about what a religion must be to definitively constitute as a religion that causes war". Well I suppose one could argue that even if a religion is totally peaceful and accepting of other people's faiths/interchangable with their philosophy, simply not being a part of someone else's violent religion gives grounds for disagreement. But that's kind of a "you need at least two sides to have a war" kind of thing so that's a bit irrelevant.

Really? The problem of evil is a classic example of such an attempt. It's convinced a lot of people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

That puts pressure on the concept of a morally admirable god who is also omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient (Yahweh is one), but a god who is completely uninterested in humans, justice, etc, or even a god who is amoral doesn't suffer from this attempt. One may question what the point of such a god is, but that's largely irrelevant to the point dondon made. It's like trying to prove fairies don't exist.

Agnostics have a lack of belief in God and a lack of belief in the nonexistence of God. This seems to be true. To say that atheism = lack of belief in God is to say that atheists can be agnostic. This just seems intuitively contradictory. Atheists want to say that they believe in the nonexistence of God, which entails a lack of belief in God. But a lack of belief in God doesn't entail the belief of the nonexistence of God (that's atheism).

dondon's claim (as far as I understand it) is that you CAN be an agnostic atheist; you have a lack of belief in a god but you aren't quite sure. I think the problem with his position is that it basically means all atheists are agnostics because one can't be sure there is no god, but not all agnostics are atheists, as you may lean towards it. I agree this clashes with perhaps more intuitive understandings of the terms but I don't really understand the problem with the position. It is somewhat of a complex issue given that there are some atheists (like myself) that sort of yearn for some kind of spiritual connection or experience, essentially wanting there to be some kind of god or spirit out there, and others who are glad and happy with the prospect of there not being a god.

Edited February 25, 2015 by Irysa

[dondon151]

If atheism is defined as the lack of belief in gods (and thus, the belief that there are no gods, because otherwise it'd fall into agnosticism field), and theism is defined as the belief in God(s), how does atheism sustain itself better than religion? Both necessitate beliefs and faith, if this definition is true.

i won't try too hard to answer this because someone will probably point out that some philosophers don't agree with me. the way i see this is that atheism as a concept can't exist without theism also existing as a concept in the way that a nonscientist can't exist without first the concept of scientist existing. i view atheism as sort of a null hypothesis with regard to religion, because it should just be the default stance unless there is evidence that a particular religion is true.

Fair, but I still can not understand how one may claim that religion in general causes wars. An ideology to be responsible for wars requires that its doctrine influences or encourages such practice, we have clear examples such as fascism and communism. I won't delve in the theological field any further because my knowledge about it is little (and should those who know little about theology even be claiming that 'religion causes wars'?), but in order for this generalization to be true, most religions must encourage or influence wars in their doctrine, there must be a high enough sample. Where is the evidence backing up this claim?

i think it's a bit unsophisticated to just say that religion causes wars. different religions have different risks for causing wars based on how divisive their ideologies are. they promote group cohesiveness, and members of a cohesive group are more likely to defend the group against what they perceive to be external threats. some of them may specifically prophesy that they are destined to rule over the earth, or whatever.

it's like saying that patriotism causes wars. patriotism also promotes group cohesiveness, but it varies along a spectrum of "this country is great" to "this country is better than all other countries and should have dominion over them."

Edited February 25, 2015 by dondon151

[Chiki]

Are we even presently capable of analysing God (assuming he exists, of course) on such level?

No, we never will, because the entire concept of God is so scientifically implausible in the first place (if you take God to be omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent).

How does one 'prove' something philosophically?

By reasoning, of course.

The claim by theists is that the existence of God is metaphysically necessary (exists in all possible worlds). Here is how what I said relates to my response to dondon: suppose the problem of evil proves that God isn't omnibenevolent in our world, because our world sucks. Our world is a possible world. So God doesn't exist necessarily. So the theist is wrong. Assuming the problem of evil argument is right, I've just proved that God doesn't exist necessarily.

but a god who is completely uninterested in humans, justice, etc, or even a god who is amoral doesn't suffer from this attempt.

Ok, but this doesn't contradict the idea that it is possible to prove negative claims via reasoning (God's existence).

Also, this isn't the only argument against God's existence. People have issues with the very concept of God as omnipotent and omniscient. Is such a thing even logically possible? And if God obeys the laws of logic, is omnipotence even a meaningful concept?

The problem with the concept of God is different from the concept of fairies. Fairies are winged flying things--there's no way that is logically impossible. The concept of God is more similar to a square circle (an object with is both round and a square). Both may be logically impossible; in the case of the square circle, it certainly is.

dondon's claim (as far as I understand it) is that you CAN be an agnostic atheist; you have a lack of belief in a god but you aren't quite sure.

I'm agnostic atheist myself, so yes. An adjective like "atheist" comes in degrees. I have a very strong disbelief in God, but not a 100% strong disbelief in God, which is what makes me an agnostic atheist. There's still a tiny bit of ambivalence in my disbelief.

Edited February 26, 2015 by Chiki

[Irysa]

Ok, but this doesn't contradict the idea that it is possible to prove negative claims via reasoning (God's existence).

This still isn't really proof because theists can use some pretty crazy reasoning to justify evil (most notably GOD DOESN'T HAVE TO MAKE SENSE TO US MORTALS), but since I'm not interested in devil's advocating ridiculous arguments I won't continue along those lines. You have definitely pressured the concept of an omnibenevolent god, but there is something of a difference between attempting to show that a god cannot be truly omnibenevolent (by human standards anyway) and disproving his existance. Yahweh might exist...but Christians might be totally wrong about his benevolence.

Also, this isn't the only argument against God's existence. People have issues with the very concept of God as omnipotent and omniscient. Is such a thing even logically possible? And if God obeys the laws of logic, is omnipotence even a meaningful concept?

Again, not all gods prescribe to such notions. If we're going to be specific about the problems with the Abrahamic god then please be more clear. I think you might be reffering to him since you're capitalising god but I'm not sure.

The problem with the concept of God is different from the concept of fairies. Fairies are winged flying things--there's no way that is logically impossible. The concept of God is more similar to a square circle (an object with is both round and a square). Both may be logically impossible; in the case of the square circle, it certainly is.

This is a good point, thank you. I suppose this could extend to any unexplainable phenomena that is actually observable in the world, as even magic/miracles can hypothetically involve some sort of crazy technology that we don't understand.

I'm agnostic atheist myself, so yes. An adjective like "atheist" comes in degrees. I have a very strong disbelief in God, but not a 100% strong disbelief in God, which is what makes me an agnostic atheist. There's still a tiny bit of ambivalence in my disbelief.

So what was your problem with his position then? I mean you did say...

"To say that atheism = lack of belief in God is to say that atheists can be agnostic. This just seems intuitively contradictory."

Which I broadly agree with, but now you're saying you accept agnostic atheism, which I would also categorise myself under.

Edited February 26, 2015 by Irysa

[Chiki]

This still isn't really proof because theists can use some pretty crazy reasoning to justify evil

Yes, I'm not denying that. What I'm saying is that it's at least possible to prove the non-existence of God. I mean, it's easily possible to prove the non-existence of square circles, right? In fact, I can do it right now.

Again, not all gods prescribe to such notions. If we're going to be specific about the problems with the Abrahamic god then please be more clear. I think you might be reffering to him since you're capitalising god but I'm not sure.

I don't really care about any notion of God apart from him as omnipotent and omniscient. That's not relevant to the discussion.

So what was your problem with his position then?

The idea was to compare a strong atheist to a strong agnostic. It would be contradictory in that case. I'm a strong atheist and a weak agnostic, so no contradiction arises.

It's like comparing a red ball to a blue ball. A ball can't be mostly red and mostly blue at the same time, but it can have a little blue and a lot of red.

Edited February 26, 2015 by Chiki

[Irysa]

I don't really care about any notion of God apart from him as omnipotent and omniscient. That's not relevant to the discussion.

Now I'm confused again. Are you trying to say your own notions aren't relevant or that my request that you be more specific isn't relevant? I'll assume the latter.

The fact of whether you care or not is secondary to the point that we were discussing the ability to prove/disprove god/gods, and the positions you've presented work mostly to destabilise specific (but popular) examples, not god as a notion. Statements such as;

"What I'm saying is that it's at least possible to prove the non-existence of God."

I would be interested in seeing expanded, but the term "God" doesn't lend itself to clarity because otherwise we end up with somewhat irrelevant counterarguments (that I've ended up posting) that don't apply to the example you're arguing against. By being a bit more clear, it's possible to avoid uneccessary complications such as this. I think that the problem of evil speaks more about the capability and benevolence of god according to human moral principles, rather than his existance. This makes it a somewhat tangential argument, but if you've any others to present I'd like to hear them.

The idea was to compare a strong atheist to a strong agnostic. It would be contradictory in that case. I'm a strong atheist and a weak agnostic, so no contradiction arises.

It's like comparing a red ball to a blue ball. A ball can't be mostly red and mostly blue at the same time, but it can have a little blue and a lot of red.

I feel as if his positions of atheist or theist are relatively concrete by nature of the terminology though. Either you do believe, or you don't believe, it is categorical. How strongly you hold your position is measured in your agnosticism. This is because belief doesn't need to be backed up by evidence of any sort to be a belief when we are asserting belief in things we aren't able to verify, such as the future. I believe that today, I won't get a phonecall. Naturally, I can't be sure about this, and to a degree my belief is based on various other factors, but I still believe that I won't get a phonecall even without the ability to see the future/percieve the unknowable.

[Chiki]

The fact of whether you care or not is secondary to the point that we were discussing the ability to prove/disprove god/gods

The context of this discussion is about Abrahamic Gods. It's not possible to disprove the existence of a god that isn't omnipotent or omnibenevolent or omniscient. I have no problem admitting that. I just don't care.

Either you do believe, or you don't believe, it is categorical.

Really? You can say "I have a strong belief in God" and you can say "I have a weak belief in fairies." So this means that belief comes in degrees like tall or happy. Further evidence is seen here in a dictionary entry. People talk about strong and weak beliefs all the time and this is completely intuitive and not contradictory to think so.

We can define an agnostic atheist as follows: x is an agnostic atheist if and only if x has a nearly unshakable (but not completely) belief that God doesn't exist. We can define atheist as "x is an atheist if and only if x has an unshakable belief that God doesn't exist." We can define agnostic as "x is an agnostic if and only if x has a lack of belief in the existence and the non-existence of God."

Edited February 26, 2015 by Chiki

[Irysa]

The context of this discussion is about Abrahamic Gods. It's not possible to disprove the existence of a god that isn't omnipotent or omnibenevolent or omniscient. I have no problem admitting that. I just don't care.

It wasn't specified at any point which deity we were talking about. But whatever, we've wasted enough time on this. Apologies.

Really? You can say "I have a strong belief in God" and you can say "I have a weak belief in fairies." So this means that belief comes in degrees like tall or happy. Further evidence is seen here in a dictionary entry. People talk about strong and weak beliefs all the time and this is completely intuitive and not contradictory to think so

Belief is definitely measured in degrees but if you are a theist, you have to actually believe as prerequisite, and if you don't believe you simply aren't, the strength is irrelevant here. Even "I'm not sure if god exists" is basically a disbelief in a categorical sense. I think the problem here is that I'm not entirely convinced atheism is about rejecting religion, because you can be an apathetic atheist and just not care. For example, it is simply a default position within British society that astrology is nonsense, and thus people have a lack of belief by default. If you do believe you would be distinct as a believer, wheras everyone else doesn't neccessarily have to strongly express the fact that they don't care/don't believe in astrology in order to not be a believer.

We can define an agnostic atheist as follows: x is an agnostic atheist if and only if x has a nearly unshakable (but not completely) belief that God doesn't exist. We can define atheist as "x is an atheist if and only if x has an unshakable belief that God doesn't exist." We can define agnostic as "x is an agnostic if and only if x has a lack of belief in the existence and the non-existence of God."

I'm comfortable with the first two in your own definitions of atheism, but the final one is questionable because it could apply to apatheists as well as agnostics.

I would just be repeating myself from the second quoteresponse I made earlier in this post on talking about why I'm not convinced one has to have a firm belief that god doesn't exist to be an atheist. Perhaps we need to come up with a better term to represent people who would identify as atheists that doesn't have an association with a rejection of religion?

Edited February 26, 2015 by Irysa

[Chiki]

Belief is definitely measured in degrees

Actually, now that I think about it, it's not. Because you can't slightly believe something or and you can't completely believe something. You either believe something or you don't. But you can still have a strong belief or a weak belief (this doesn't mean that belief comes in degrees, it's just about how shakable your belief is depending on the evidence that is presented).

I guess I have to revise my definitions here. Someone is an atheist iff they have a belief, strong or weak, that God doesn't exist. Someone is an agnostic atheist iff they have a belief that God doesn't exist and a belief that God's existence or nonexistence isn't provable. Someone is an agnostic iff they lack a belief or disbelief on the existence of God. Notice that agnostic atheists aren't agnostics on this definition. And being an agnostic atheist entails that you are an atheist. This sounds good.

but the final one is questionable because it could apply to apatheists as well as agnostics.

If an apatheist is an agnostic who just doesn't care, then this is actually a good thing. Being an apatheist should entail that someone is an agnostic. Someone is an apatheist iff someone has a lack of belief or disbelief towards God's existence, and they also don't care about God's existence.

Edited February 26, 2015 by Chiki

[Topazd]

I'm not ardent to get into any debates here, but I do think this was a pretty cogent definition for atheism. (0:28 - 1:22)

[Irysa]

Actually, now that I think about it, it's not. Because you can't slightly believe something or and you can't completely believe something. You either believe something or you don't. But you can still have a strong belief or a weak belief (this doesn't mean that belief comes in degrees, it's just about how shakable your belief is depending on the evidence that is presented).

I guess I have to revise my definitions here. Someone is an atheist iff they have a belief, strong or weak, that God doesn't exist. Someone is an agnostic atheist iff they have a belief that God doesn't exist and a belief that God's existence or nonexistence isn't provable. Someone is an agnostic iff they lack a belief or disbelief on the existence of God. Notice that agnostic atheists aren't agnostics on this definition. And being an agnostic atheist entails that you are an atheist. This sounds good.

Well, the first point is what I already said, but I do think that you can measure the degree of a belief. The thing is that relative to this argument, where we're categorically assigning "believes in a deity", and "does not believe in a deity" onto people, it is irrelevant. The degree of a belief is still present, just that the degree itself doesn't matter in the categorisation.

For the second point, again we're in the territory of "do you have to specifically believe god does not exist to constitute an as an atheist?". Surely a lack of belief is essentially saying "I don't believe in god"? It's less assertive, but it amounts to the same thing, neither the agnostic nor the atheist believe in god and are distinctly separate from the theist.

Edited February 26, 2015 by Irysa

[Chiki]

Well, the first point is what I already said, but I do think that you can measure the degree of a belief. The thing is that relative to this argument, where we're categorically assigning "believes in a deity", and "does not believe in a deity" onto people, it is irrelevant. The degree of a belief is still present, just that the degree itself doesn't matter in the categorisation.

For the second point, again we're in the territory of "do you have to specifically believe god does not exist to constitute an as an atheist?". Surely a lack of belief is essentially saying "I don't believe in god"? It's less assertive, but it amounts to the same thing, neither the agnostic nor the atheist believe in god and are distinctly separate from the theist.

First bolded part: Do you think these two sentences are grammatical?

1. I completely believe that John is dead.

2. I slightly believe that John is dead.

Compared to:

3. It is slightly likely that John is dead.

I think 3 sounds better by far than 1 and 2. So belief doesn't come in degrees.

Second bolded part: No, a lack of belief in God doesn't entail that one believes that God doesn't exist. This is just a purely logical and semantic fact. Take the sentence "Chiki doesn't believe that God exists." This means that it is not the case that the belief relation holds between Chiki and the proposition "God exists." This could be true because of two reasons: Chiki believes that God doesn't exist, or Chiki lacks the belief that God exists. The truth of this sentence doesn't tell us which is true.

On the other hand, take the sentence "Chiki believes that God doesn't exist." This can only be true when Chiki believes that God doesn't exist. It cannot be true when Chiki lacks the belief that God exists, because the sentence asserts that I believe something, not that I lack a belief in something.

Edited February 26, 2015 by Chiki

[Irysa]

First bolded part: Do you think these two sentences are grammatical?

1. I completely believe that John is dead.

2. I slightly believe that John is dead.

Compared to:

3. It is slightly likely that John is dead.

I think 3 sounds better by far than 1 and 2. So belief doesn't come in degrees.

1. I think could be phrased better, something such as "I am entirely sure that John is dead", in which case, perfectly fine.

2. Once again, phrasing. "I am inclined to believe that John is dead", or something along those lines, once again, seems fine to me.

3. "There is a small chance that John is dead" doesn't seem to have anything to do with belief, that's more like an observational statement. Not sure how it relates to belief in degrees.

How about this.

"I am about 50% sure (in my belief) that John is dead."

I do not outright believe he is dead, but simulteanously do not outright believe he is not dead. If we adjust the value it would be inclined to one way or the other but that's unimportant. I consider this example somewhat different from belief in god as I think that by default, we don't have a knowledge or belief in god, wheras the issue of whether we believe John is dead or not depends on a variety of other factors. Additionally, unless we are trying to make a distinction between "people who believe John is dead" and "people who do not believe that John is dead" (as with the theism points) then this kind of uncertanity is legitimately common and can be related to other less morbid topics.

Second bolded part: No, a lack of belief in God doesn't entail that one believes that God doesn't exist. This is just a purely logical and semantic fact. Take the sentence "Chiki doesn't believe that God exists." This means that it is not the case that the belief relation holds between Chiki and the proposition "God exists." This could be true because of two reasons: Chiki believes that God doesn't exist, or Chiki lacks the belief that God exists. The truth of this sentence doesn't tell us which is true.

On the other hand, take the sentence "Chiki believes that God doesn't exist." This can only be true when Chiki believes that God doesn't exist. It cannot be true when Chiki lacks the belief that God exists, because the sentence asserts that I believe something, not that I lack a belief in something.

Hmm, I see. In that case, perhaps I don't truly qualify as an atheist? I'm not sure if I can say "I believe that a god does not exist", but I am comfortable in saying that "I don't believe that a god exists".

[Chiki]

1. I think could be phrased better, something such as "I am entirely sure that John is dead", in which case, perfectly fine.

All of your examples do not concern how much a person believes in something. What they concern is the belief of how likely something is to be true. In other words, in that sentence, you believe the proposition that it is 100% likely that John is dead. It is not the case that you have a 100% belief that John is dead. That sounds like nonsense.

Hmm, I see. In that case, perhaps I don't truly qualify as an atheist? I'm not sure if I can say "I believe that a god does not exist", but I am comfortable in saying that "I don't believe that a god exists".

Yep. Sounds like an agnostic.

Edited February 27, 2015 by Chiki

[Irysa]

I suppose I'm more of an "anti-organised religion" agnostic then I suppose.

All of your examples do not concern how much a person believes in something. What they concern is the belief of how likely something is to be true. In other words, in that sentence, you believe the proposition that it is 100% likely that John is dead. It is not the case that you have a 100% belief that John is dead. That sounds like nonsense.

I'm still not entirely sure what the difference is. If you believe the proposition that it is 100% likely that John is dead, do you not as a result also have a 100% belief that John is dead? Assuming that at 100% we reach the point of completely believing a notion, how are they not interchangable? And if they are interchangable, the grammatical tweaking of the tenses doesn't seem to cause an issue. Even ignoring this, I think I raised a fair enough point with regards to how it is common for people to hold positions where they are uncertain in their belief to various degrees between two points of contention, and that this is not a problem unless we demand categorisation.

Edited February 27, 2015 by Irysa

[Chiki]

do you not as a result also have a 100% belief that John is dead?

You're confusing 100% belief with a 100% strong belief. Suppose I have a weak belief that God exists. Then the sentence "Chiki believes that God exists" is true. Suppose John has a strong belief that God exists. Then the sentence "John believes that God exists" is true. Take the sentence "Chiki and John believe that God exists." True again, with no issue whatsoever, because it's completely irrelevant how strong a person's beliefs are, because John and I both believe that God exists.

[Irysa]

Yes but I've already stated repeatedly that when we're categorising something like that the degree becomes irrelevant. (In fact didn't I raise that originally?) That doesn't show that a degree of belief is not an existant thing, merely that it is not relevant to some discussions.

Also, I'd argue one can't actually say they believe the proposition that it is 100% likely that John is dead if they are not absoloute in that belief. If the statement was less clear, such as "I believe in the proposition that John is dead" then the degree to how far you believe in it isn't assumed by believing the proposition, you can believe it a degree. But if you believe the proposition that it is 100% likely then you're essentially saying you believe that there is no chance that John is not dead, in which case you could say "I am entirely sure that John is dead" as a substitute for "I wholeheartedly/completely believe that John is dead"